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THE “BLAINE” DEBATE: MUST STATES
FUND RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS?
LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER*
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,1 the United States Supreme
Court held—by a vote of 5 to 4—that the funding of religious
schools with taxpayer money through voucher programs does not
violate the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.2
Emboldened by this success, voucher proponents now attack state
constitutional provisions (often called “Blaine Amendments”)3 that
prohibit taxpayer funding of religious schools.
These state
provisions, which may stand in the way of religious-school voucher
programs, are attacked as violative of the federal Constitution,
rooted in anti-religious bias, or otherwise illegal or unwise.
It is my view that efforts to force states to fund religious
schools through voucher plans or otherwise will and should fail. My
reasons for this conclusion are two-fold. First, there is no viable

*Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. This article includes
remarks given at a symposium co-sponsored by the Pew Forum on Religion
and Public Life and the University of North Carolina School of Law on March
28, 2003, and I would like to thank the participants in that symposium for their
comments.
1. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
2. Id. at 648–63.
3. In 1875, Congressman James G. Blaine of Maine introduced a federal
constitutional amendment that would have prohibited the payment of
money—raised by taxation, in any state, for the support of public schools—to
institutions under religious control. See LLOYD P. JORGENSON, THE STATE
AND THE NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL, 1825–1925, at 138–40 (1987). Although this
federal amendment failed, contemporary state constitutional prohibitions that
prohibit public funding for religious schools are often collectively called
“Blaine Amendments” or “Little Blaines” by their opponents. This is true
even though, in many cases, these state laws predated the federal Blaine
Amendment by decades, were born of different political circumstances, or
are—in their current forms—the products of twentieth century law reform
projects.

UNDERKUFFLER_BLAINEDEBATE-PP.DOC

180

2/25/2004 1:43 PM

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2

federal constitutional argument that states are required to fund
religious institutions, including religious schools. Second, there are
excellent reasons why the funding of religious institutions is very
bad and dangerous policy—reasons which states are free to use as
the groundings for their own policies, and which the decision in
Zelman has left untouched.
I. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
In Zelman, the Supreme Court narrowly held that the
federal Establishment Clause presents no barrier to the
establishment of a state educational voucher program that includes
the funding of religious schools. This decision rests, fundamentally,
on the idea that because voucher money is given to an individual,
who then transfers it to a religious school, there is an insufficient
association of the state with the religious institution to trigger
federal Establishment Clause guarantees.4
I believe that Zelman was wrongly decided. To my mind,
government cannot deliberately rid itself of public functions and
public liabilities through the simple insertion of private
decisionmaking between its actions and the anticipated and
authorized results of those actions.5 However, Zelman held that
federal Establishment Clause jurisprudence will not make that
connection, and so, as a result, states are not prohibited by that
Clause from voucher funding of religious schools. The question that
voucher proponents now press is something else. We know, after
Zelman, that the federal Constitution does not prohibit states from
(voucher) funding of religious schools, but the question remains:
does the federal Constitution demand that they do so?
The idea that states are required to fund religious
4. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652 (“[W]here a government aid program . . .
provides assistance [to] . . . citizens, who, in turn, direct government aid to
religious schools . . . as a result of their own . . . private choice, the program is
not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause.”).
5. Laura S. Underkuffler, Vouchers and Beyond: The Individual As
Causative Agent in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 167 (2000)
(arguing that public voucher money cannot simply be laundered through
“private choice” as a way to avoid Establishment Clause guarantees).
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institutions, through vouchers or otherwise, is not something that
the Supreme Court has ever addressed, let alone endorsed.6
Indeed, the Court’s decisions over the past fifty years have been
grounded in the opposite assumption: that state funding of
religious institutions is something which involves palpable problems
and dangers, and therefore is something with which we, as a
constitutional matter, only reluctantly and incidentally agree.
Voucher proponents would turn this area of jurisprudence on its
head. Not only would the Constitution allow such funding—it
would command it.
Voucher proponents argue—in a claim that is initially
limited to vouchers, but that would conceivably apply to any kind of
public funding—that if a state program funds secular schools, then
that program must fund religious schools as well. Their particular
targets are state constitutional provisions (“Blaine Amendments”)
that explicitly or implicitly prohibit the payment of public money to
religious institutions, including religious schools. They argue that
such laws are unconstitutional because they discriminate against
religious institutions and religious individuals in violation of Free
Exercise and Establishment Clause guarantees.7
To build their claim, voucher proponents generally begin
with one of the Supreme Court’s seemingly grand statements of
equality. For instance, the Court has stated that government must
favor “neither one religion over others[,] nor religious adherents
collectively over nonadherents.”8 Such statements are, voucher
6. Indeed, the Court has indicated that states are free to adopt more
stringent church/state separation than what the federal Constitution requires.
See, e.g., Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489
(1986) (although the state program in question did not run afoul of the federal
Establishment Clause, “[o]n remand, the state court is of course free to
consider the applicability of the ‘far stricter’ dictates of the Washington State
Constitution”).
7. Although the targets of complaint are most often state laws that
explicitly except religious institutions from public funding programs, the same
arguments can be made against any state constitutional provision or law that
restricts funding to “public” or “secular” institutions. In all such cases,
“discrimination” against religious institutions and individuals arguably exists,
since their causes are not the equal recipients of government largesse.
8. Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696 (1994) (plurality opinion).
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proponents argue, clear statements of a federal, constitutional,
“nondiscrimination” guarantee.
Although there is a certain superficial appeal to this
argument, even casual reflection compels the conclusion that such
statements cannot have the sweeping and a-contextual meaning
that voucher advocates imply. Never has the Supreme Court held
that religion and nonreligion must be treated equally for all
purposes under the Constitution. Indeed, the idea that religion and
nonreligion must be treated equally for all purposes is a completely
implausible proposition. The First Amendment’s Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses are themselves testaments to the fact
that religion is afforded certain privileges and is subjected to
particular disabilities in ways that nonreligion is not. Cases dealing
with the protection of free religious exercise, the protection of
religious conscience, the avoidance of endorsement of religion by
government, the separation of government and religious
institutional authority, and so on, are premised on the obvious
assumption that religion is both a specially privileged and a
specially restricted category in constitutional jurisprudence.
Indeed, it is highly unlikely that voucher proponents who
advance this argument truly want equality of treatment of religion
and nonreligion by law. Most generally have no desire that
religion’s special privileges—such as exemptions from state landuse laws, exemptions from federal draft laws, exemptions from state
immunization laws, exemptions from employers’ work rules,
exemptions from state lobbying restrictions, and so on—be
abolished in the name of “equality.” Rather, they envision a system
in which religion retains its difference from other (secular) belief
systems when it comes to benefits, but loses its difference from
other (secular) belief systems when it comes to disabilities.
This is an enviable goal but an impossible one. It is
impossible because the same characteristics that entitle religion to
special protection in law are also the reasons for its disabilities. We
protect religious conscience and we worry about the funding of
religion by government for the same reason: because of the
particular value, power, and consequent dangers that religious
beliefs present. If religion is “just another personal belief system”
in one context, then it is “just another personal belief system” in the
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other. To adopt the broad notion of “equality” or “neutrality” that
voucher proponents urge would require the abolition of all of the
special privileges under law that religion now enjoys. It would also
require us to dismantle the core ideas about religious difference
that have grounded our convictions about religious freedom and
separation of church and state for more than two centuries.
Obviously, a more nuanced understanding of the idea of
equality of religion and nonreligion is required. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has applied this concept in three settings, which
voucher advocates cite: where religious persons are subjected to
discrimination because of their status, or identity, as religious
persons;9 where religious viewpoints are excluded from otherwise
open, public fora;10 and where religious practices are limited or
proscribed solely because of hostility on the part of state actors to
the religious nature of those practices.11
None of these situations resemble the question before us.
The refusal of a state to fund religious education (or other religious
activities) does not discriminate against religious persons on the
basis of their status or identity as religious persons. In McDaniel v.
Paty, the case on which this kind of equality is based, the Supreme
Court held that a state law that prohibited a “minister” or “priest”
from holding public office “because of his status as a ‘minister’ or
‘priest’ ” offended the Free Exercise Clause of the federal
Constitution.12 In other words, government cannot deny a civil
right or other benefit, otherwise afforded to all, because an
individual is a Jew, Catholic, Mormon, Muslim, priest, minister,
imam, or of no religious affiliation at all. This injunction is clear
and unequivocal. It is not, however, what state refusal to fund
religious schools or other religious institutions involves. Individuals
are unable to secure state money, under the challenged state laws,
9. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (plurality opinion).
10. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819 (1995); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753 (1995) (plurality opinion); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
11. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 524 (1993).
12. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 627.
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not because of their identity or status as religious persons—they are
unable to secure this money because of the use to which that money
would be put.
Voucher advocates respond to this analysis by arguing that
this analysis understands “religious status” or “religious identity”
too narrowly. They argue that “religious status” encompasses not
only membership in a religious organization, but also all of the
practices and activities that the religion in question involves. If one
is a religious person, and if being a religious person involves
attending religious schools, then the ineligibility of religious
schooling for public funding is a “religious status” claim.
Nonreligious persons, they argue, get their schooling funded;
therefore, religious persons must get their schooling funded, if the
state is to avoid a “religious status” claim.
The sheer scope of this claim is breathtaking. What, exactly,
are its limits? If the ability to attend religious schools is part of
“religious status,” why not the ability to attend religious gatherings?
Or the ability to pursue religious rituals? Or the ability to
experience religious governance? Or the ability to engage in
religious cultural expression? Indeed, why doesn’t the religious
counterpart of any and every funded secular activity present a
“religious status” claim? Under the logic of this argument, for
every secular (state) service, function, benefit, program, or
institution, there must be a religious alternative—or else, by explicit
or implicit exclusion, religious persons are penalized by their
inability to engage in those (religious) practices and activities that
secular society affords to its members. If the state provides voucher
funding for secular schools, it must provide voucher funding for
religious ones; if the state funds secular counseling, or health, or
other services, it must fund religious ones; if the state funds secular
art, or music, or other cultural activities, it must fund religious ones;
if the state funds secular meetings, conferences, or societies, it must
fund religious ones; and so on.
Under no conceivable
interpretation does the McDaniel principle go so far.
The principle behind the “public fora” cases is also
inapposite to the question of compelled state funding of religious
schools. In those cases, the Supreme Court held that where a forum
for public speech is created or maintained by government, equal
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access to that forum must be given, if requested, to the religious
viewpoint.13 Citing these cases, voucher advocates claim that
elementary and secondary schools are “public fora” and, thus,
religious schools must be funded equally with secular ones. How a
private religious school can be a “public forum” is, however,
unexplained. In addition, if religious schools are “public fora” for
the religious viewpoint, surely churches, synagogues, mosques, and
other religious institutions are as well. The idea that religious
institutions must be equally funded with taxpayer dollars in order to
ensure “viewpoint neutrality” stretches this principle beyond
recognition. It also contradicts the Court’s unbroken view that
government should, as far as possible, avoid the business of
religious funding.
Finally, voucher proponents argue that the antidiscrimination principle of Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
v. City of Hialeah demands equal funding of religious schools. In
Lukumi, the Court held that if “the object or purpose of a law is the
suppression of religion or religious conduct,” then the Free
Exercise Clause demands that it be justified by a compelling
government interest.14 This case is also inapt. The object or
purpose of a government’s refusal to fund religion is not the
suppression of religious conduct—it is avoidance of the
divisiveness, strife, and violations of conscience that forcing
taxpayers to fund the religions of others involves. Such concerns
are not only permissible ones for government—they have been
assumed to undergird our essential understandings of First
Amendment guarantees for more than two hundred years.15
There is, thus, no existing Supreme Court jurisprudence that

13. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828–37 (requiring equal access to
university-sponsored plan which would pay for a student newspaper’s printing
costs); Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 392–94 (requiring equal access to school
facilities for after-school activities); Pinette, 515 U.S. at 760–63 (requiring
equal access to a state-owned square).
14. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.
15. See, e.g., Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious
and the Secular: A Foundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36
WM. & MARY L. REV. 837, 930–56 (1995) (discussing historical roots and
contemporary understandings of no-funding guarantees).
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can reasonably be interpreted to require that states fund religious
schools or other religious institutions. As we look to the future,
however, the question remains whether this is a necessary or
desirable result, or whether it is, in fact, ill-founded.
II. THE DEEPER ISSUE
The push to fund religious schools through vouchers and
other schemes has pressed an underlying question. Whatever the
current state of the law might be, perhaps it is time to change it. As
one commentator wrote five years ago:
There is nothing inherently undemocratic
about providing public funds for children to
attend religious schools. The practice is quite
common in Western nations, where it is
perceived as an expression of religious liberty
to enable parents to educate their children in
accord with the dictates of their faiths. . . . Since
1992, even socialist Sweden has begun to
provide government support to private and
religious schools in response to pleas from
religious and language minorities.16
In the United States, no one denies the right of parents to
choose private schooling, including religious schooling, for their
children.17 Rather, the question is whether taxpayers must fund the
schooling that those parents choose. Proponents often set forth a
reassuring assessment of public funding of religious education in
the United Kingdom and Europe as evidence that historical
concerns on such funding in this country are overdrawn. Is the
experience abroad really so reassuring?
In the spring of 2001, I was contacted by Harry Judge of
16. Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine’s Wake: School Choice, The First
Amendment, and State Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 657,
665 (1998) (citations omitted).
17. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 518 (1925) (holding that
a state’s role in the education of its citizens must yield to the right of parents
to provide an equivalent education for their children in a privately operated
school, including a religious school, of the parents’ choosing).
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Oxford University to see if I would contribute to a special issue of
the Oxford Review of Education. This issue, with contributions
from scholars throughout the United Kingdom, would deal with
what has become an extremely divisive social and political issue:
taxpayer funding of religious education.
It seems that the pacific ideal of taxpayer funding of
religious schools in the United Kingdom and Europe that American
commentators have touted is, in fact, crumbling in the face of
increasing religious diversity. In these countries there has been, for
instance, fast growth of Islamic communities, including those of a
traditional or fundamentalist nature. These communities, quite
understandably, now demand the equal public funding of their
schools. With these demands has come difficult and divisive
controversy. Although the citizens of these countries were very
willing to publicly fund the schools of the religions with which they
felt comfortable, they are not prepared to publicly fund religious
schools that advance views the majority finds alien, disturbing, antiassimilationist, or otherwise outside their conceptions of
mainstream British or European values. As a result of the public
crisis that this issue has caused, the attitudes of citizens—as
assessed by a former chairman of the United Kingdom’s
Commission for Racial Equality—“appear to be hardening and
intolerance to differences is growing.”18 As Harry Judge has
written,
Confidence in the extension of faith-based
schools, in England at least, seems to be based
on the unspoken assumption that most of the
new state funding will go to the “mainstream”
Christian groups . . . . It does not appear that
those promoting such developments have yet
given a great deal of thought to the broad
implications of a significantly wider extension
of such financial support, including support for
groups which have not yet asserted
18. Harry Judge, Faith-Based Schools and State Funding: A Partial
Argument, 27 OXFORD REV. EDUC. 463, 473 (2001) (quoting ECONOMIST,
Sept. 21–Oct. 5, 2001, at 58).
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themselves.19
Indeed, as Chris Hewer, Advisor on Inter-Faith Relations to the
Bishop of Birmingham, has written, “Perhaps if we were starting
today with a completely[,] if implausibly clean slate, we would make
all schools ‘secular,’ teach all pupils about all faiths, and leave
religious inculcation to the religious establishments outside
schools.”20
The people of the United Kingdom, who have tacitly
assumed that public funding would be extended only to
“acceptable” religions, are not alone in their assumptions. For
instance, when respondents in this country were asked in a New
York Times/CBS News Poll whether it would be “a good idea for
the federal government to give money to religious organizations to
provide social services like job training and drug treatment
counseling,” 66% answered affirmatively. However, when asked
whether this would be true “if . . . the government would be giving
money to religious organizations like the Nation of Islam, Church
of Scientology, and the Hare Krishnas,” only 29% agreed.21 One
can only guess what the approval figures would have been for
religious groups such as the Branch Davidians, the Children of
God, and Wiccans. What about taxpayer funding for schools that
teach white supremacy, or that AIDS is a curse that God has
wrought on homosexual sinners, or that the religious teachings of
others—Judaism, Catholicism, Islam, etc.—are evil or dangerous
heresy? What about taxpayer funding for religious schools that
teach, as a matter of religious command, that girls are by nature
inferior to boys, or that “ ‘the wife is to subordinate herself to her
husband’ and that ‘the woman is to place herself under the
authority of the man[,]’ in the same way that ‘the church is to place
herself under the protection of Christ?’ ”22
19. See id. at 469–70.
20. Chris Hewer, Schools for Muslims, 27 OXFORD REV. OF EDUC. 515,
525 (2001).
21. Richard L. Berke & Janet Elder, 60 Percent Favor Bush, But
Economy is Major Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2001, at A1.
22. Jennifer Lee, Attack on Judicial Nominee Leads Panel to Delay Vote,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2003, at A22 (quoting published (and controversial)
religious views of a federal judicial nominee).
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In fact, the vaunted “religious tolerance” in this country is
very superficial. After the events of September 11, 2001, the
unjustified backlash against Muslims was obvious and dangerous.
Indeed, we in North Carolina recently experienced our own episode
of religious intolerance and divisiveness. In the summer of 2002, in
an effort to “stimulate discussion and critical thinking around a
current topic,” incoming students to the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill were directed to read Approaching the
Qur’an: The Early Revelations, a book translated and introduced
by Michael Sells, a Haverford College professor.23 When the
assignment of this book was publicly discovered, vehement
reactions followed. One campus evangelist labeled the actions
“offensive” on the ground that “this country was founded on
Christianity, not the Qur’an.”24 A television talk show host
commented that he didn’t know “what this serves[,] to take a look
at our enemy’s religion.”25 A lawsuit was filed in federal court
against the university, alleging that the university was promoting
Islam and encouraging students’ conversion. The North Carolina
House Appropriations Committee voted 62–10 to bar funding for
the university’s summer reading program during state budget
hearings. Lead counsel for the plaintiffs in the federal lawsuit
stated ominously, “We think that what we’ve uncovered so far is
just the tip of the iceberg.”26
To forestall such divisive and bitter battles over public
funding of religion, many states have either flatly prohibited
taxpayer funding of religious institutions, or prohibited it implicitly
by restricting public funding to public institutions.27 Indeed, to the
23. See APPROACHING THE QUR’AN: THE EARLY REVELATIONS
(Michael Sells trans., 1999).
24. See Norm Pattis, Defining What’s Dangerous: A Public Scared of Its
Shadow, 28 CONN. L. TRIB. 17 (2002).
25. The O’Reilly Factor: Impact: Interview With Robert Kirkpatrick (Fox
News television broadcast, July 10, 2002) (transcript on file with First
Amendment Law Review).
26. Eric Ferreri, Quran Suit Not Resolved: Complaint Against UNC
Amended, Attacking Its Claims as Misleading, HERALD SUN (Durham, N.C.),
Nov. 24, 2002, at A1.
27. Many states have such laws.
[No] grant, appropriation or use of public money . . . shall
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extent that we have achieved religious tolerance in this country, it
is, in my view, precisely because we have enforced separation of
church and state, particularly in areas as divisive and controversial
as elementary and secondary education. We have not forced
approval of religious groups and their practices as a public issue—
we have not forced taxpayers to fund groups, activities, and beliefs
with which they deeply disagree. It is precisely this confluence of
issues that the idea of separation of church and state in this country
was designed to prevent.
Voucher advocates have several answers to these dangers.
First, they argue that these dangers can be avoided if the practices
or teachings of participating schools are monitored and controlled,
either through denying participation to particularly offensive
groups outright, or by enumerating particular practices or teachings
that are unacceptable in participating schools. For instance, schools

be made or authorized by the Commonwealth or any
political subdivision thereof for the purpose of founding,
maintaining or aiding any . . . institution, primary or
secondary school, or charitable or religious undertaking
which is not publicly owned and under the exclusive
control, order and supervision of public officers or public
agents [nor shall any such] . . . grant, appropriation or use
of public money . . . be made or authorized for the
purpose of founding, maintaining or aiding any church,
religious denomination or society.

MASS. CONST. AMEND. art. XVIII § 2.
No public monies . . . shall be appropriated or paid . . .
directly or indirectly to aid or maintain any private,
denominational or other nonpublic, pre-elementary,
elementary, or secondary school. No payment, credit, tax
benefit, exemption or deductions, tuition voucher,
subsidy, grant or loan of public monies . . . shall be
provided, directly or indirectly, to support the attendance
of any student [in such a school].

MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
“No public money . . . shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious
worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious
establishment.” WASH. CONST. art. I § 11. “All schools maintained or
supported wholly or in part by the public funds shall be forever free from
sectarian control or influence.” WASH. CONST. art. IX § 4.
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run by religious “cults” that lack particular institutional credentials
could be excluded, or schools that engage in discriminatory
practices such as religious admissions tests, or those with teachings
that a majority of citizens find offensive, could be disqualified.28
In my view, any such efforts will either prove to be entirely
superficial, or, if not, will be practically unworkable and held
constitutionally invalid. Simple requirements for nondiscrimination
in admissions will hardly solve the problem, since it is highly
unlikely that those who deeply disagree with a religion’s practices
will apply for the admission of their children to that religion’s
schools, or, if they did, that the presence of those children will have
any real impact on those schools’ practices. With any more
profound attempt to control religious schools, however, serious
problems begin. Any attempt to distinguish “acceptable” from
“unacceptable” religious groups would violate the guarantee of
equal treatment of all religions by the law, which the Establishment
Clause unquestionably requires.29 Although the prohibition of
certain practices or policies—such as overt engagement in racial
discrimination—might be possible, on the ground that the federal
constitutional prohibitions on race discrimination outweigh any
conceivable argument that religious schools might make, the
constitutionality of attempts to disqualify other practices—such as
preferential admissions for co-religionists, or religious or gender
discrimination (on religious grounds) in the hiring of faculty and
staff—is far less clear.30 When one moves to control the content of
28. For instance, the voucher plan in Zelman excluded schools that
“discriminate on the basis of race, religion or ethnic background,” or
“advocate or foster unlawful behavior or teach hatred of any person or group
on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion.” Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 645 (2002).
29. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943) (“[I]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.”); id. at 658 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that choice of particular groups by government would
“resurrect the very discriminatory treatment of religion which the Constitution
sought forever to forbid”).
30. Indeed, it is because of the power of competing free exercise claims
asserted by religious groups that religious institutions enjoy broad exemptions
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teaching in religious schools, the constitutional and practical
problems that are presented become unworkable. Any effort by
the state to directly censor or control the content of teachings by
religious schools would (rightly) be seen as an infringement on the
constitutional guarantee of religious free exercise, and any effort to
do this indirectly through eligibility for government funding would
undoubtedly be challenged as an unconstitutional condition that
requires, for participation in a government program,
relinquishment of a constitutional right.31
In addition, the
eradication of offensive teachings from religious classrooms
pursuant to such laws would require continual, substantive, and
intrusive surveillance, something which such schools would be
unwilling to tolerate and which public authorities could not
realistically enforce.
Voucher advocates next argue that although these problems
might be real when religious schools are directly funded by
taxpayer money, they are not real when such funding is by virtue of
“parental choice.” They argue that when parents choose religious
beneficiaries, the state is not associated by taxpayers with the
funded activities. As a result, all of the identified dangers of state
funding vanish. This argument echoes the Supreme Court’s
decision in Zelman, in which the Court held that the funding of
religious schools with taxpayer money through voucher programs
does not violate the Establishment Clause of the federal
Constitution. In so doing, the Court did not hold that there is no
constitutional problem with state funding of religious institutions.
from anti-discrimination claims under civil rights laws. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(e)(2) (stating that an employer may employ persons of a particular
religion (to the exclusion of others) if the employer is an educational
institution that is, in whole or substantial part, owned, supported, controlled,
or managed by a particular religion or religious organization, or if the
curriculum of the institution is directed toward the propagation of a particular
religion).
31. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518–19 (1958) (discussing
this doctrine in the First Amendment context); cf. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173, 196–98 (1991) (concluding speech restrictions imposed as a condition for
receiving federal family-planning money were not unconstitutional, since they
did not deny recipients the right to engage in protected activities, but rather
“refused to fund such activities out of the public fisc”).
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Instead, the Court held that voucher programs are not state funding
at all. This is because, in the Court’s view, the passage of the
money through the hands of parents removes the state as the
“actor” in those cases. If money is paid to religious schools, it is
parents, not the state, who are making these choices. Thus, the
Establishment Clause—with its purposes and prohibitions—is
simply irrelevant.32
This theory, which I have called the “theory of the
individual as causative agent,”33 is not new in constitutional
jurisprudence. In Norwood v. Harrison,34 the Supreme Court was
confronted with a state funding scheme in which textbooks were
purchased by the state and lent to students in both public and
private schools, including all-white private academies. This lending
program was established to enhance “educational choice” and to
circumvent prohibitions on direct public funding of schools that
engaged in discrimination on the basis of race. Proponents argued
that this funding scheme was beyond constitutional cognizance
because the decisions of parents to send their children to all-white
schools was a matter of private choice. The Supreme Court
rejected this argument, and chose instead to see the substance of
the transaction for what it was. The Court held the program
unconstitutional, since “ ‘a state may not induce, encourage, or
promote private parities to accomplish what it is constitutionally
forbidden to accomplish.’ ”35
To my mind, the Court’s view in Norwood captures the
nature of such transactions far more accurately than does its
Zelman rationale. The idea that state voucher programs involve
individual (not state) funding begs reality, when the state authorizes
and anticipates individual transfer of state-provided funds to
recipients who provide a service (education) in which the state
retains a vital interest, and which the state would otherwise be
required to provide. These are programs in which individual

32. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 616–17.
33. See, Underkuffler, supra note 5.
34. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
35. Id. at 465 (quoting Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp.
458, 475–76 (M.D. Ala. 1967)).
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decisions to forward voucher money to religious schools are
entirely related, anticipated, and authorized actions, which
accomplish the goal—the public funding (of public and private)
education—that the state has previously identified. Certainly,
states are free to conclude that in the public mind, the substantial
funding of schools through vouchers will be seen as the public
funding of those schools, with all of the contentiousness that such
funding schemes present.36 Indeed, voucher advocates themselves
acknowledge this reality. Although they insist on the one hand that
there is no connection between the state and voucher-funded
schools, they simultaneously urge, on the other hand, that racially
discriminatory or other undesirable schools not be funded through
these programs, because of the legal and political difficulties that
state funding of such schools would create.
There are, in short, excellent reasons why states might wish
to prohibit the public funding of religious schools through public
voucher programs, whether that prohibition is accomplished by
“Blaine Amendments” or otherwise.
Finally,
voucher
advocates
argue
that
“Blaine
Amendments” and other state laws that prohibit public funding of
religious schools were born in the throes of religious bigotry, and
thus should be struck down on that basis. Whatever abstract
notions one might concoct to justify such laws, the truth, it is
argued, is that these laws, were motivated by anti-Catholic bias.37

36. State court decisions that have so concluded include California
Teachers Ass’n v. Riles, 632 P.2d 953, 960–64 (Cal. 1981); Holmes v. Bush, No.
CV 99-3370, 2002 WL 1809079 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 5, 2002); Spears v. Honda,
449 P.2d 130, 134–38 (Haw. 1968); Epeldi v. Engelking, 488 P.2d 860, 865–66
(Idaho 1971); Fannin v. Williams, 655 S.W.2d 480, 482–84 (Ky. 1983); Opinion
of the Justices to the Senate, 514 N.E.2d 353, 356–57 (Mass. 1987); Paster v.
Tussey, 512 S.W.2d 97, 103–05 (Mo. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1111 (1975);
Dickman v. School District No. 62C, 366 P.2d 533, 539–42 (Ore. 1961), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 823 (1962); Elbe v. Yankton Independent School District No.
63-3, 372 N.W.2d 113, 117 (S.D. 1985); Almond v. Day, 89 S.E.2d 851, 856–57
(Va. 1955); Chittenden Town School District v. Department of Education, 738
A.2d 539, 563 (Vt. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1066 (1999); Weiss v. Bruno,
509 P.2d 973, 980–81 (Wash. 1973).
37. See, e.g., Judge, supra note 18, at 659 (stating that the Blaine
Amendment and its progeny are “remnant[s] of nineteenth century religious
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It is necessary to face the religious bigotries that have
infected our national history, and which continue to infect it.
Indeed, that reality is the cornerstone of my position. Knowledge
of such historical sentiments does not, however, broadly invalidate
all laws passed during such periods, as voucher proponents argue.
There are several reasons that demand this conclusion.
First, it is virtually impossible to untangle the sentiments that
“motivated” the original drafters, ratifiers, or supporters of these
laws, or which have resulted in their continued inclusion in state
constitutional and statutory schemes. As historians have noted,
legal prohibitions against public funding of religious schools were
the products of far more diverse political, religious, and educational
concerns than simple anti-Catholic animus, or any other
particularly identifiable view.38 In addition, whatever the origins of
these laws, many have been reconsidered and re-ratified by
legislative action and popular vote during far more contemporary
times.39 Although bias against particular religious groups might
bigotry promulgated by nativist political leaders who were alarmed by the
growth of immigrant populations and who had a particular disdain for
Catholics”).
38. See, e.g., JORGENSON, supra note 3.
39. For instance, article I section 3 of the Constitution of Florida
prohibits the payment of public monies “directly or indirectly in aid of any
church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution.”
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3. When the 1968 Constitutional Revision Commission
proposed this section’s removal, “the Florida Legislature took action to retain
and to strengthen” the restriction. Holmes, No. CV 99-3370 at 5. Article IX,
section 8 of the Constitution of California provides, “No public money shall
ever be appropriated for the support of any sectarian or denominational
school, or any school not under the exclusive control of the officers of the
public schools.” CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 8. An attempt to amend this principle
to allow school vouchers was defeated overwhelmingly by voters in 1993. See
Cynthia Bright, The Establishment Clause and School Vouchers: Private
Choice and Proposition 174, 31 CAL. W.L. REV. 193 (1995). During the New
York State Constitutional Convention of 1967, a concerted effort was made to
remove article IX, section 3 of the Constitution of New York, which
prohibited funding of religious schools. “[T]he proposed repeal . . . initiated
three months of religious dissension throughout the state; the battle was fierce
and unseemly, and the wounds will not quickly heal.” Lewis B. Kaden, The
People: No! Some Observations on the 1967 New York State Constitutional
Convention, 5 HARV. J. ON LEG. 343, 359 (1968). The proposal was ultimately
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have been part of the historical background for some of these laws,
decisions to retain them in the twentieth century undoubtedly
reflect far more complex understandings.40 Just as our collective
understanding of equal protection has advanced during the past
hundred years, so has our understanding of religious freedom.
Moreover, if religious bigotry, racism, sexism, or other dark
motives of those who enact laws are fatal to those laws, few
eighteenth or nineteenth century laws would survive legal scrutiny
today. The federal Constitution itself was adopted in a world that
accepted and wished to preserve slavery, the disenfranchisement of
women and the poor, and all forms of religious bigotry. At the time
of their enactment, the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment
were viewed by the vast majority not as guarantors of individual
religious freedom, but as guarantors that local religious
establishments—which existed, in some form, in all of the
American colonies—would not be threatened by a rival federal
establishment. These colonial establishments included the criminal
prosecution of Quakers, Baptists, Jews, Catholics, Lutherans,
Muslims, atheists, and others; the restriction of citizenship, the
ability to hold office, and other civil rights to particular Protestants
or to persons willing to swear to a particular religious creed; the
defeated. Article VIII, section 2 of the Constitution of Michigan, which
prohibits any “payment, credit, tax benefit, exemption or deductions, tuition
voucher, subsidy, grant or loan of public monies . . . , directly or indirectly” to
nonpublic schools, was adopted by popular referendum in 1970 after extensive
public debate. See Traverse City Sch. Dist. v. Attorney General, 185 N.W.2d 9,
13 (Mich. 1971). Constitutional provisions in Washington, which prohibit the
payment of any public money for “any religious worship, exercise or
instruction, or the support of any religious establishment,” WASH. CONST. art.
I, § 11, and which provide that “[a]ll schools maintained or supported wholly
or in part by the public funds shall be forever free from sectarian control or
influence,” were originally adopted in 1889, but were reconsidered and
retained in 1904, 1958, and 1993. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11; art. IX § 4.
40. Indeed, even those who raise the anti-Catholic argument
acknowledge that the reasons for separation of church and state are far more
complex today. See, e.g., Viteritti, supra note 16, at 559 n.10 (“I do not mean to
suggest here that separationist instincts are largely motivated by religious
bigotry. Nevertheless, one cannot deny its influence in the historical
development of the issue, nor that the relative neglect of its role on the part of
legal scholars makes the story worth telling.”).
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forced financial support of the colony’s official religion; and so on.41
The truth of our history is that all religious groups, with the
possible exception of narrow brands of Protestants, have been the
subjects of religious persecution and religious bigotry. I agree that
we should be aware of the history of religious intolerance in this
country—indeed, I believe that we should be acutely aware of that
history as we consider the question before us. However, we must
consider the contemporary purposes and effects of contemporary
ratification of state separationist laws in determining their validity.
If our objective is the promotion of religious tolerance and religious
peace, forcing taxpayers to fund religious schools with which they
deeply disagree will only work to our detriment.

41. See Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 15, at 879–91. For instance, the
New Jersey Constitution of 1776 provided that each person shall have “the
inestimable privilege of worshipping God according to the dictates of his own
conscience,” but public office was limited to those persons “professing a belief
in the faith of any Protestant [Christian] sect.” N.J. CONST. of 1776, arts.
XVIII–XIX, in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND
COLONIES, NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 2594, 2597 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONS]. The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 required the
following oath for public office: “I do believe in one God, the creator and
governor of the universe, the rewarder of the good and the punisher of the
wicked. And I do acknowledge the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament
to be given by Divine inspiration.” PA. CONST. OF 1776, PLAN OR FRAME OF
GOVERNMENT FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, § 10, in 5
CONSTITUTIONS, supra at 3084, 3085. The Delaware Constitution, ratified in
1776, required all state officers to swear a Trinitarian oath and to declare their
belief in the divine inspiration of the Scriptures. DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 22,
in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra at 562, 566.
Religious intolerance was not limited to Protestant Christians. When
Maryland was a Roman Catholic colony, a penalty of death and forfeiture of
estate was imposed on any person who “ ‘shall hence forth blaspheme
God, . . . or deny our Savior Jesus Christ to be the Son of God, or shall deny
the Holy Trinity of the Father the Son and the Holy Ghost, or the Godhead of
any of the said three persons of the Trinity’ ”. LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE,
AND FREEDOM 83 (1953) (quoting the Maryland Act of Toleration of 1649).
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